

S Y N O P S I S

O F

L E C T U R E S

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B E L L E S L E T T R E S

A N D

L O G I C.

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S Y N O P S I S

OF

L E C T U R E S

ON

B E L L E S L E T T R E S

A N D

L O G I C.

R E A D I N T H E

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

S E C O N D E D I T I O N.

E D I N B U R G H :

P R I N T E D F O R E L P H I N G S T O N B A L F O U R.

M, DCC, XC.



S Y N O P S I S

OF THE

L E C T U R E S

ON

BELLES LETTRES.

INTRODUCTION.

I.

OBJECT of the course, 'to
'explain the most proper me-
'thod of communicating thought,
'whether by speaking or writing,
'and to illustrate the principles of
'sound criticism.'

A

Faculty

2 INTRODUCTION.

Faculty of communication, one of the most eminent endowments bestowed on man.—Without it little progress could be made in knowledge or refinement.—Communication arbitrary as to sounds and characters.

II.

Manner of great importance to the speaker.—Hence the controversy whether the orator is more indebted for success to nature or art.—The complete orator the combined production of both.—Nothing eminent to be attained without application, but particularly in eloquence.

III.

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III.

Knowledge of the art of writing requisite to every author—and in some measure to the reader.—The public ear too refined to allow currency to any productions not adorned with the graces of execution, however meritorious they may be in point of subject and research.—Without some acquaintance with the principles of criticism, even reading is not attended with much pleasure or emolument.

IV.

Rhetoric and criticism a branch of the pleasures of imagination.

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These

4 INTRODUCTION.

—These derived from the large field of objects which interest this faculty; bounded, on one hand, by the objects of science addressed to the understanding; on the other, by the objects of instinct addressed to the external senses.—Oratory, poetry, painting, music, and all the subjects of taste, constitute parts of them.

V.

These pleasures are felt and relished by men in all ages of society, but particularly in periods of refinement.—They prevent the abuse of riches.—They occupy the mind with innocence, if not with dignity, and oppose or retard the dege-

INTRODUCTION. 5

degeneracy of nations.—They are therefore entitled to attention, on account of their public utility.—But the study of them is of most extensive advantage, by cultivating taste, and by teaching us to extract from reading an elegant relaxation, or an increase of knowledge.

VI.

The rules of criticism do not interfere with exertions of genius,—nor cramp the imagination.—They improve the mind, and enlarge the sphere of its knowledge.—Clear ideas and accurate expression are nearly connected.—The more the taste and accomplishments of the reader resemble those of the

A 3

writer,

6 INTRODUCTION.

writer, the more accurate will be his judgments, and the greater his pleasure.

VII.

Course consists of three parts.
It treats,

I. Of language and style.

II. Of eloquence, or public speaking.

III. Of the most eminent kinds of composition in prose and verse.

PART

P A R T I.

OF LANGUAGE AND STYLE.

SECTION I.

Of the Origin and Progress of Language.

I.

LANGUAGE the art of communicating thought by means of articulate sounds.—These acquired by imitation.—Competent to man only.—Written language a symbol of spoken, and spoken a representation

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tation of ideas.—The ingenuity displayed in the formation of language, no proof of its being derived from inspiration.—The improvement of it manifestly keeps pace with the progress of society toward refinement.

II.

The language of Savages a collection of words, which denote the objects and attributes with which they are familiar.—Savages addicted to exertions of imagination and passion.—Their language accordingly ardent, abrupt, figurative, poetical.—As society advances, reason gains ascendancy, and language becomes more regular and copious,

ous, but less animated.—Men, in rude ages, from the imperfection of their speech, and the prevalence of imagination, often express themselves by symbols and gesticulations, and even by actions.

III.

All orders of men easily fabricate words, or new modes of phraseology, when they have new ideas to communicate.—The ancient languages of Greece and Italy are deficient with respect to large classes of words, which denote branches of knowledge unknown to the polished inhabitants of these countries.

IV.

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IV.

Progress of language, in respect of sound.—Inquiry whether the languages of Greece and Rome were pronounced in musical cadences, or whether the *ρυθμος* of the Greeks, and *numerus* of the Latins, related entirely to what is commonly called melodious diction.—Musical cadences, or recitative, unnatural,—inconsistent with the language of passion,—tiresome and disgusting.—A mixture of the tones of speech with those of music in pronunciation, still more fantastic.—The tones of speech, and those of music, not regulated by the same principles, either in point of variety or length.—*ρυθμος* and *numerus* meant the
the

AND STYLE. 11

the introduction of metrical feet into compositions in prose ;—and the compositions which contained most of these feet were deemed most rhythmical or musical.

V.

The smoothness or melody of language corresponds to the refinement of the public ear.—Pronunciation of barbarous nations abounds with harsh combinations of consonants and guttural sounds.—These gradually disappear.—English language.

VI.

The progress of language, in respect of the changes introduced by custom.

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custom.—No living tongue stationary.—Academies insufficient to prevent variations;—and no other expedient, however desirable, seems to promise success.

VII.

Changes, arising from this source, begin in the capital, or seat of government, and proceed gradually toward the extremities of a country.—Many provincial words found in old authors, who, in their own times, must be supposed to have been patterns of fashionable composition.—Shakespeare.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Principles of the arrangement of words in sentences ; and the origin and progress of writing.

I.

ARRANGEMENT of words regulated principally by the superior prevalence of the faculties of reason or imagination.—Reason dictates the grammatical order, because that order is a picture of the succession of ideas in the mind, while under the influence of this faculty.—In the order of reason or

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grammar, the agent or nominative first makes appearance :—The agent is succeeded by the action or the verb :—And the verb is followed by the subject.—These are the principal parts of all sentences ; and the chief use of the other parts is to limit, explain, or conjoin them.

II.

The order suggested by the imagination reverses the arrangement of reason or grammar, sometimes by giving precedency to the verb, but most frequently by exhibiting, first, the subject, next, the agent, and last, the action.—The reason is, the imagination is guided not by the order of grammar, like reason,
but

but by its attachment to the objects it surveys; and it arranges them according to the measure of its attachment.—It is most attached to the subject, which it places first; in an inferior degree to the agent, which it places next; least to the action, which it places last.—*μηλον μοι δος. Pomum mihi praebe.*

III.

Hence this simple theory of the arrangement of words:—‘ It is most
‘ inverted in early periods of socie-
‘ ty, because the prevalence of ima-
‘ gination is then most conspicuous;
‘ but inversion becomes less violent,
‘ as reason gains ground; and, in
‘ works of science, it disappears al-

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‘most altogether.’—The vivacity of imagination which distinguished the Greeks and Romans, rendered their languages more inverted than those of modern times.

IV.

But modern languages are less inverted than those of antiquity, from another cause.—They have fewer inflexions; and the only method of preserving perspicuity, the first law of good writing, is the juxta-position of connected words, which often interferes with inversion.—Examples of arrangement in antient and modern languages.

V.

V.

Inconsistent with the genius of the English language to approximate its arrangement to that of the languages of antiquity.—Writers in the end of the last century.—English written with much correctness and propriety in the beginning of that century.

VI.

The prevalence of imagination and of inversion in rude periods, accounts for the previous appearance of poetry to prose.—Reason is the faculty, to the cultivation of which men last apply themselves.—Poetry intended to gratify the imagination,

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gination, or to display the feelings of the heart, with which early ages are chiefly delighted.—The utility of political, historical, and philosophical researches in the progress of society, prompts the cultivation of reason, and the desire of communicating instruction in prose.—Good prose composition among the latest attainments of polished nations.—The most fortunate period for poetical exertions, between the decline of the general influence of the powers of imagination and the cultivation of reason by science and philosophy.

VII.

Poetical compositions were committed to memory, and recited or sung in public assemblies, before the use of writing.—Recitation continued in Greece after the introduction of that art.—The rudiments of writing were probably paintings or hieroglyphics.—Deaf people.—Mexicans.—An extremely imperfect mode of communication.—The Egyptians did not use them to conceal their knowledge.

VIII.

Hieroglyphical characters still employed in China.—Said by some to amount to 50,000, by others to 70,000.

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70,000.—An insuperable obstacle to progress in knowledge.—Letters found first among the Phoenicians.—The probable mode of procedure in the invention of them.—Alphabet brought into Greece by Cadmus, who probably conducted thither a colony of his countrymen.—Original method of placing lines.—Implements of writing among the antients.—Printing only could completely diffuse written language.

S E C T.

S E C T. III.

Of Grammar.

I.

NECESSITY of undertaking a philosophical discussion of the principles of grammar, in order to explain the structure of language, and the principles of criticism.—The investigation of these principles will also illustrate the operations of the human mind, the most useful species of knowledge we can acquire.

II.

II.

All the words of language are divided into certain classes, called *Parts of Speech*.—Of little consequence whether these classes are more or less numerous.—We may assume the most common division into nine, Article, Noun, Pronoun, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Preposition, Interjection, Conjunction.—The principal of these are *Noun* and *Verb*, which will therefore attract chief attention.—The rest will require much less explication.

III.

All knowledge consists in an acquaintance with the substances, whether

whether corporeal or mental, which exist in nature, and with the actions or operations these substances exert, in respect of one another.—The capital parts of speech correspond to this distribution of knowledge.—The Nouns are the names of the substances, the Verbs denote the energies or actions.—The use of the other parts of speech is to represent, explain, restrict, or extend these names and actions, to signify their connections, or to mark the transitions of the mind from one of them to another.—Names are nouns substantive;—and a language is perfect with regard to them, when every substance, or class of substances, about which

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which the people who use it have occasion to converse, has received a name.

IV.

The nouns of a language would be infinite, if every individual substance were to have a name.—The constitution of things has made this unnecessary, as it would have been impracticable.—Few individuals differ from all other individuals.—The productions of nature appear in classes.—The word *Plant* may denote any vegetable, and the word *Animal* any living creature.—These comprehensive terms are called *Genera*, and are subdivided, the former into
Trees,

Trees, Shrubs, Grasses; the latter into Men, Horses, Sheep, &c.—These subdivisions are called *Species*, and each of them comprehends many individuals.—Language artfully takes hold of this arrangement of nature;—and to abridge the number of its nouns, gives names chiefly to classes of substances, making one name denote a whole class.—Thus the word *Tree* signifies a whole genus of plants; and Oak, Ash, Elm, mark each a whole species.

Language rarely descends to assign names to single oaks, ashes, or elms, because it is seldom necessary to be so particular.—Sometimes, however, it is necessary to give names to individuals.—Most of the

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individuals of the human race are entitled to this distinction, and occasionally some of the inferior animals.

V.

Substantives denoting classes are called *Common* nouns, those denoting individuals are termed *Proper* nouns.—Common nouns are susceptible of number.—If they denote one only, they assume the singular, or number appropriated to unity; if they signify more than one, they assume the plural, or number appropriated to many.—The Greek is the only language which, by its dual, can signify a determinate number in the plural.—Other languages

languages employ words to signify determinate numbers.

VI.

Substantives are often attended with circumstances ;—something may belong to them, or depend on them ;—may be given to them, or be taken from them ;—may be contained in them, or be got through them.—These circumstances are expressed either by variations of the termination of the noun, called Cases ; or by prefixing little words, called Prepositions.—Respective merits of these methods, and the usage of different languages.

VII.

Distinction of sex, called *Gender*, is also competent to substantives.—In nature, animals only have difference of Sex.—But many classes of substances remain which have no gender.—One of two methods must have been adopted with regard to them.—Either to arrange them under a third gender, which had no foundation in nature ;—or, if the two genders of nature only should be employed, to suppose them, contrary to truth, either male or female, and to arrange them under these genders.—The former method was thought preferable by the Greeks and Romans.—The latter has been followed by the Italians and French.
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—The English language exactly copies nature, and is in this view most simple and perfect.—It acquires that merit by allowing no distinction of gender to its adjectives.—This peculiarity also adds interest to our poetical compositions, by permitting us occasionally to bestow life and gender on inanimate objects ; in which cases we dignify them by the application of the pronouns significant of sex.—The analogy of termination frequently sets aside the analogy of nature respecting gender in the antient languages.—Signification often produced a similar effect.

VIII.

Articles and adjectives restrict and explain substantives, and naturally claim discussion after them.—The article *a* refers a substance to its species, without particularising what one of the species it is.—*A man* may denote any male creature of the human species, known or unknown.—The article *the* goes farther, and distinguishes some individual.—*The man*, signifies some man marked and known.—The former is called the indefinite, the latter the definite article.—The Greek, French, and Italian, possess only the definite article, and the Latin no article.—Illustration of the merit of these languages in this respect.

IX.

IX.

Adjectives and participles differ only in denoting time, which is the province of the latter; both express properties or qualities of substantives.—Susceptible of comparison, or of signifying the augmentation of qualities.—The degrees of these augmentations innumerable; but language has not attempted to mark more than two stages of them, *greater* and *greatest*.—The antient languages often denoted comparisons by changes of the terminations of adjectives; but the moderns lean to the use of auxiliary words.

X.

X.

Pronouns are mere representatives of nouns, and assume all their properties when they come in their places.—They would therefore require no explication, were there not something peculiar in their construction and declension.—Without pronouns, the frequent repetition of nouns would be intolerably irksome.—Examples.—Without them also verbs could have had only one person, namely the third;—the first and second persons being entirely adapted to the use of pronouns.—The pronoun *I* is said to be of the first person, because the speaker or writer employs it to denote himself.—*Thou* or *you* is called the second person,

person, because the speaker or writer distinguishes by it the creature or thing he addresses.—*He, She, It*, are of the third person, because they mark some creature or thing absent.

XI.

The substantive pronouns are more numerous in English than in any other polished language.—Because its pronouns of the third person are suited exactly to the genders of nature; *He* signifying the male, *She* the female, and *It* every thing that has no gender.—But, from its great simplicity and accommodation to nature, it is defective in admitting little variety of gender
in

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in the singular, and no variety in the plural of these pronouns.—Personal pronouns only have an accusative case, which is always used after an active verb.

XII.

The characteristic of the verb is action,—which supposes an agent, and a subject on which the agent acts.—Hence the common definition of verb, that it signifies *to be, to do, or to suffer*.—Along with action, verb denotes concomitant circumstances.—The chief of these are the *time* when the action is done, and the *manner* of doing it.—*Time* is signified by the tenses of verbs; manner by their

their modes.—The antient languages denote time and manner chiefly by changes of the termination of the verb; the modern languages by words called auxiliaries; but the former use some auxiliaries, and the latter some variety of termination.—Along with action, time, and manner, verbs are provided with terminations to express person and number.—The combination of all these circumstances renders the verb the most intricate of all the parts of speech.

XIII.

The verb can mark time in the most general manner only.—It descends little farther than the gross division of it into past, present, and future.—If more accuracy is necessary, other words must be employed.—It is in the past tense chiefly that the verb exhibits subdivision of time.—Polished languages present the following subdivisions.—A pluperfect tense, by which is understood, that the action was performed previous to some past point of time.—A perfect tense, by which is meant, that the action is completed at the time it is signified.—And an imperfect tense, by which is denoted, that
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the performance was going on, but was not completed at some past point of time.—The Greek, the French, and the English, have beside a tense called an aorist, which includes the whole of past time, and means no more than that the action is finished.—The Latin has not this tense.

XIV.

The capital circumstances respecting the manner of an action, relate either to its performance, or to the power, inclination, or obligation of the agent to perform it ; or to his right to intreat or command the performance ; or finally, to the exhibition of the action, without

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any consideration of the agent.—Hence the four modes of polished languages.—The Indicative denotes performance.—The Subjunctive expresses the inclination, power, or obligation of the agent, but leaves the performance to be determined by circumstances not yet come into existence ; on which account it has got the name of a Conditional Mode.—The Imperative exhibits the agent as intreating or commanding the performance.—And the Infinitive expresses the action in general, without reference to any agent ; hence it is called Infinite ; the other modes are called Finite.—In the present and past tenses, the indicative mode denotes that the action is performed, or is performing.

forming.—In the future tense, it approaches the nature of the subjunctive, and marks intention only, because the time of performance is not arrived.

XV.

In the present and past tenses, the subjunctive mode is significant of disposition, relative to performance; such as will, power, capacity, obligation.—But, as the agent can communicate dispositions only with which he is acquainted, namely those of past and present time, and can have no conception of future dispositions which do not exist; so the subjunctive mode can properly have no future tense.

XVI.

The tense commonly called the Future of the Subjunctive, is an Indicative, or Affirmative tense.— *I shall have loved*, is equally affirmative with *I shall love*, though the former is commonly arranged as a future of the subjunctive, and the latter as the future of the indicative.

The imperative mode also is significant only of the disposition of the agent expressed by intreaty or command.

XVII.

XVII.

Modern verbs chiefly inflected by auxiliaries.—Those of the indicative are, *have*, *had*, *shall*, *will*.—*Have* and *had* denote time only;—*shall* and *will*, along with time, signify inclination or resolution.—*To be*, denotes existence.

XVIII.

May and *can* are the auxiliaries of the subjunctive; both express capacity or ability.—The indicative is the mode of science or perfect information; the subjunctive is the mode of uncertainty and hesitation.

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XIX.

Remarks on auxiliaries.—Antient inflections more beautiful and melodious ; modern auxiliaries more simple and accurate.

XX.

Nature of the infinitive.—Significant of action, without consideration of the agent.—Equivalent to a substantive ;—sometimes to an adjective.—The time of the infinitive to be reckoned from the time of the preceding verb, on which it depends.—Errors against this rule frequent.

XXI.

XXI.

Adverbs restrict and limit verbs.
—Adverbs of place,—of time,—
of quality, or manner.—Adverbs
follow neuter verbs ;—frequently
precede active verbs, but follow the
subjects of active verbs.

XXII.

Conjunctions connect substan-
tives, or clauses of sentences.—Of
corresponding conjunctions in pe-
riods.

XXIII.

Interjections ;—their nature and
use.—Fewer in modern languages
than in the antient.

XXIV.

XXIV.

Remarks on the study of grammar.—Utility of it.—Necessary, in order to write or speak with propriety and elegance.

S E C T. IV.

Of Style.

I.

SOMETHING peculiar in the use and arrangement of words.—Different sorts of style.—Comprehends perspicuity and ornament.

II.

II.

Perspicuity the first ingredient of good style.—But style is not perfect till it has received the polish of ornament.—Perspicuity requires that the reader should perceive the meaning, as fast as he can peruse the words.

For this purpose, three things are requisite :—That the writer possess clear ideas :—That he employ the most significant words :—And that he arrange distinctly these words in sentences.—The doctrine of clear ideas belongs to logic.

III.

In the choice of words, he must attend to purity,—propriety,—and
precision.

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precision.—Purity demands the use of classical words only—Propriety, that the most pertinent words shall be chosen—And precision, that no more words shall be employed than are sufficient to convey the sense.

What words are pure to be ascertained by the authority of the best speakers and writers.—Authority not to be extended so far as to preclude improvements.

IV.

Errors against Purity.

1. The use of foreign words, particularly Latin, when our language possesses native words equally melodious and expressive.

2.

2. The use of French words.—Opinion of different critics on this subject.—The present tendency perhaps toward the adoption of French idioms.

3. The use of words, provincial, vulgar, antiquated, or recent.—The different dialects of Greece.—Method of avoiding provincial and vulgar words.—Persons may write well a language which they cannot speak;—and may speak a language which they cannot write.—Method of avoiding words antiquated or recent.

V.

Errors against Propriety.

1. The use of words which do not express the sense.—Examples.

2.

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2. Grammatical inaccuracies.—
Examples.

3. Careless management of the
correspondent conjunctions.—Ex-
amples.

4. Careless use of the relatives.
Different cases of this error.

1. The relative sometimes improp-
erly omitted.—Examples.

2. The antecedent improperly
omitted.—Examples.

3. The same pronoun frequently
referred to different antecedents in
the same sentence, a source of much
obscurity.—Examples.

VI.

Precision violated,

1. By the use of superfluous
words.—Examples.

2.

2. By the use of words and phrases which repeat the same idea in a different form, or which include the meaning of one another.

Words often not synonymous, which at first view appear to be so.

—Examples.

VII.

The arrangement of words in sentences.

Sentence and period are commonly reckoned equivalent terms. —They denote the quantity of words comprehended between two points in writing, which exhibit a complete meaning, independent of what either precedes or follows. —Periods consist of subdivisions, called members.

VIII.

Every sentence must contain at least an agent and an action, or a nominative and a verb; but generally it contains a nominative, a verb, and a subject or accusative.— If it contains two classes of nominatives, verbs, and subjects, depending on one another, it is said to consist of two members; if three, of three members; if four, of four members; and then generally it takes the name of period.

IX.

Circumstances are sometimes subjoined to members by adjectives and participles.—A sentence, consisting
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of one nominative, verb, and subject, or of one member, is called Simple.—One, consisting of more members, is termed Complex.—Quintilian is of opinion, that a period should seldom contain more members than four.—The occasions on which simple and complex sentences are eligible.

X.

The unity of a sentence consists in denoting one proposition.—The most complex sentences, properly construed, cannot admit more than one leading idea, and the circumstances which depend on or explain it.—Hence the principle which should regulate the length

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of sentences.—They should be longer or shorter, as the leading ideas they express have more or fewer circumstances connected with them.

XI.

The greater part of sentences composed of two or three members.—The members of many sentences conjoined loosely by copulatives.—Such sentences seldom comprehend more than two members.—Sentences, containing correspondent conjunctions, rarely composed of more than two members.—The most forcible periods include many members closely connected ;—are generally conditional, and are introduced

roduced by conditional particles.
 —In loose sentences, each of the members may convey a complete sense.—In periods, the sense is never complete till the close ; and the members separately convey not a full meaning.

XII.

Antient critics inaccurate in their explanation of the nature of a period.—Aristotle's definition,—‘ A portion of composition which has ‘ a beginning, a middle, and an ‘ end.’—The names given to it by Cicero and Quintilian are, *ambitus*, *circuitus*, *comprehensio*, *continuatio*, *circumscriptio*.—Their opinions about its not exceeding the length

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of four Iambic verses;—or the quantity of words which may be pronounced during one respiration of a full grown man.

XIII.

Errors to be avoided in the construction of periods.

1. Violation of their unity, which takes place when more than one leading thought is included.

2. The extending of them to too great length.

3. The making of them too short and abrupt.

XIV.

Order of the different parts of speech.—The agent appears first,
the

the action or verb next, and the subject last.—The adjective appears before the substantive, unless it introduce some circumstance depending on, or explaining the substantive.—The adverb is placed as near the verb as possible.—The pronoun occupies the place of the noun it represents.—The preposition is placed before the noun, the relation of which it denotes.—Conjunctions stand between the things they conjoin.

XV.

When two adverbs are connected with a verb, one takes place generally before it, and the other immediately after it, to the exclusion

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sion even of the subject, when some circumstance depends on the subject.—An adverb explaining or limiting an adjective is placed before it.

XVI.

Prepositions denote relations.—The relation of concomitancy seems to be the most intimate, and therefore takes precedence of all others.—The relation expressed by *from*, precedes that signified by *to*.

XVII.

When there is only one auxiliary, the adverb is situated between it and the verb. ‘ We may frequently

‘ frequently observe.’—When there are two auxiliaries, the adverb is stationed between them. ‘ I have frequently been told.’—In passive sentences, however, it is sometimes placed after both. ‘ He shall be perfectly informed.’—When there are three auxiliaries, the adverb is often placed after the last. ‘ I might have been fully satisfied.’—When two adverbs relate to the same verb, they are intermixed with its auxiliaries, if it has two. ‘ He should never have perversely disguised the truth.’—These rules, though supported by the analogies of grammar, and the general practice of our best writers, not unexceptionable.

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able.—Our usage in this respect not invariable.

XVIII.

Arrangement of circumstances in periods.—Relate to the time, place, and manner of the action; or to the motives and purposes of the agent; or to the means of accomplishing the action; and the obstacles to which its execution may be exposed.—These circumstances different from those denoted by the tenses and modes of verbs, or explicatory single words, such as adjectives or adverbs.—They are expressed by clauses of sentences; and the occasions are frequent on which they are necessary.
—Explain

—Explain and limit the principal parts of sentences; the agent; the action; or the subject: And are therefore arranged on the same principle with explicatory single words; namely, are placed as near their principals as possible.—Examples.

Improper arrangement of words and clauses of two kinds;—one leads to a wrong meaning;—the other leaves the meaning doubtful.

—Ambiguities also arise from separating the principal words of a sentence too far from one another.

XIX.

Rules for constructing sentences.

1. One principal agent should lead the sentence, and one species of

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of construction should prevail in it. —The scene should not be wantonly shifted from agent to agent ; nor should the construction be rashly changed by a mixture of verbs, active, passive, and neuter.

2. Circumstances should not follow one another ; —should be interspersed among the capital words, and appear as early in the sentence as possible ; —should never be reserved to the close.

3. Parenthesis, and the repetition of copulatives, generally to be avoided. —The omission of the copulative sometimes gives energy to a sentence, and marks that rapidity of thought which is the effect of agitation. —When several substantives follow one another in
grave

grave composition, the copulatives will be omitted or inserted, according as the substantives merit less or more the consideration of the reader.

XX.

Reflections on perspicuity.

No rules or criticisms trivial which tend to improve language, and extend the reputation of our best writers.—No polished language, perhaps, written with so much inaccuracy as the English; while the attainment of accuracy is less difficult than in most other tongues.—Punctuation an unavailing expedient to procure perspicuity.—The author who possesses valuable

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luable matter, and writes perspicuously, sure to obtain reputation.—
Perspicuity of more importance than ornament.

S E C T. V.

Of Ornament.

I.

ORNAMENT comprehends the melody of language, and the beauties resulting from inversion, and from figures.

II.

Melody includes the sound of words ; the modulation of periods ;
and

and the resemblance between the sound and the sense.—The last scarcely attainable in prose.

III.

The greater part of English words of Saxon original.—Not deficient in vowels.—Best words those in which there is a mixture of long and short syllables.—Verbs compounded of a preposition and verb, which do not easily coalesce, to be avoided.

IV.

The melody of a well constructed period.—The doctrine of Dionysius of Halicarnassus about
F 2 rhythm.

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rhythm.—Remarks on a sentence of Herodotus quoted by that critic.—Opinions of Demetrius Phalereus, Quintilian, and Cicero, very different about rhythm.—According to Cicero, the melody of periods depends on the refinement of the ear of the writer, and on his judgment in choosing the best sounding words.

V.

The sound of a period should be analogous to the sense.—The members should exceed one another in length.—All the members, but particularly the last one, should be terminated by words which end with long syllables, or at least with the penult

penult syllable long.—Periods should not be monotonous;—nor nearly of equal length;—but the art which teaches to vary them, and to render them musical, should be carefully concealed.

The cadence and melody of no author to be imitated; but the most musical writers to be read in order to refine the ear.

VI.

Resemblance between the sound and the sense.—Single words imitative of their sense, by the effort required in pronouncing them.—Or imitative of the natural sounds which they signify.—But it is chiefly with regard to motion that the sound of words resembles the sense.

VII.

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Easy or soft motion painted by a succession of flowing and melodious sounds.—Examples.

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VIII.

The sound of a period in some measure expressive of the dispositions of the mind.

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Harsh and disagreeable sounds suggest the same emotions which result from beholding any exertion performed imperfectly and with difficulty.—Examples.

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Long words composed of long syllables suggest a melancholy feeling.—Examples.

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IX.

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II.

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specting the sense as consisting of figures.

V.

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Of extensive use.—A more spirited figure than a simile.—The latter supposes likeness only between the things compared ;—the former supposes, for a moment, one to become the other.

VI.

Quintilian enumerates four sources of metaphors.

1. The resemblance one species of animals has to another.

2. The resemblance one inanimate object has to another.

3. The

3. The resemblance an inanimate has to a living object.

4. The resemblance a personified has to a living object.

VII.

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2. Should be taken from objects of dignity.—Examples.

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3. Should not be remote or obscure.—Examples.

4. An author should not begin with one metaphor, and end with another; nor mix the figurative and natural expression in such a manner, that part of it must be understood in a metaphorical sense, and part in a literal sense.—Examples.

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XI.

A series of metaphors sometimes

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introduced with grace, particularly in descriptions.

XII.

Comparisons

Should exhibit something new or uncommon.—Of two kinds,—denoting either resemblance or contrast.—Those which consist in resemblance, must take place between things of different species; because there is nothing new or uncommon in the resemblance of things of the same species.—Those which consist in contrast must take place between things of the same species; because there is nothing new or uncommon in the difference of things of different species.
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—Comparisons farther should be formed between objects of the same external sense ; because there is no resemblance between the objects of different senses.—The far greater part of comparisons taken from objects of sight, the most lively and distinct of all our senses.

XIII.

Comparisons sometimes founded on the resemblance of the emotions generated by the principal subject; and the simile which illustrates it.—Examples.

XIV.

The capital uses of comparisons are,—to improve our conceptions of the subject they are brought to

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adorn ;

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Personification,

Results from the influence which imagination and passion have upon our perceptions and opinions, and
consists

consists in ascribing the properties of living agents to inanimate substances.—A figure frequent with orators and poets.—Examples.—The attributes of living beings, and abstract ideas, are often personified.

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Descriptive personification derived from the disposition of the imagination

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XX.

Passionate personification results from the influence of passion on opinion, and supposes, for a moment, that the personified object is really endowed with life and action.

Fear,—grief,—joy,—hatred,—admiration,—revenge,—prompt this figure.—Significant of high perturbation

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XXI.

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2. They must not be delineated too minutely, nor with trifling circumstances.—Examples.

3. Must not be attempted, unless the subject possess dignity.—Examples.

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XXII.

Allegory,

A species of writing, in which one thing is expressed, and another thing is understood.—Employed when a writer wishes to communicate some important intelligence or advice, but chooses not to insinuate it in direct and plain terms.—Examples.—Consists in resemblance, as well as metaphor and comparison; but the resemblance is of a different kind.—In allegory, no supposition is made that the primary and resembling subjects are the same, as is done in the case of metaphor. Nor is the similitude between the primary and the resembling

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First sort of most general use.

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2. The application of the properties of the allegorical to the primary subject should not be strained nor obscure.

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Consists in addressing some absent object as present, and endowed with sensibility.—The examples of this figure, in which the imagination makes the least exertion, are expressive of the most violent passion;—such as addresses to friends or relations absent or dead.—The specimens where the imagination makes the most vigorous exertions, where it personifies, and addresses inanimate objects, do not excite any high degree of passion.—Examples of the latter sort, accordingly, are extended to considerable length, and are intended chiefly to gratify the imagination.—Those of the former

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XXVIII.

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Hyperbole,

Intended to gratify predilections and antipathies, by augmenting or diminishing, beyond truth, the objects of our attachment or aversion.—Of very general use, but makes its best appearance in the higher sorts of oratory and poetry.

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—Many passions prompt it.—Fear,
—admiration,—hatred,—envy,—
grief.

XXX.

Rules.

1. Must not be overstrained.
2. Must not be introduced till the mind of the reader is prepared to relish it.
3. Must not be liable to be turned against the argument of the author who uses it.

XXXI.

Climax or Amplification

Nearly allied to hyperbole.—The object of the latter to exalt our ideas

ideas beyond truth ; of the former, to elevate our ideas of the truth itself, by an assemblage of circumstances ascending one above another in point of importance.—A climax peculiarly pleasant when the gradation of the sentiment is denoted by an analogous swell of the members of a period, in point of sound.—Anticlimax a gradation downward in the sense, sometimes imitated by the order of the expression.—Examples.

XXXII.

Climax employed with propriety in oratory for procuring favour, or exciting disapprobation.—Consistent with a moderate degree of passion.

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Antithesis

Improves our conceptions of an object, by contrasting it with another possessed of similar qualities.—Takes place chiefly between things of the same species.—Antithesis in the thought should be distinguished by analogous contrast in the expression.—Peculiarly pertinent in delineating characters.—Examples.

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XXXIV.

A climax and antithesis sometimes conjoined.—Latter liable to much abuse.—Exceeding attachment to it forms the first stage toward the corruption of taste, and the decline of letters.

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Expressive of admiration ;—of lamentation ;—of energy and vehemence ;—of plaintive passion.—
Examples.

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Repetition,

Significant of energy ;—of passion

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XXXVII.

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Denotes something hinted, but not fully explained;—significant of agitation or delicacy.—Examples.

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3. No writer should attempt figures without being prompted by his imagination.

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General Characters of Style.

I.

Opinions of the antient critics.—
Differ much in their sentiments on
this subject.

II.

Five general characters of style,
namely, the Nervous and Concise ;
—the Diffuse ;—the Plain and
Simple ;—the Elegant ;—the Ve-
hement.

III.

III.

Nervous and concise,

Mark different degrees of the same quality.—Writers of this style rest their merit principally on their matter ;—address themselves chiefly to the understanding ;—compose in short sentences, but full of vigour ;—employ bold metaphors in few words, but never admit long comparisons.—No enemies to the brilliancy of a striking antithesis, but seldom indulge any other figure except interrogation.

Aristotle, Tacitus, and Montesquieu, most remarkable authors in this line of writing.

IV.

Diffuse style exhibits the sense with copiousness and variety.

A writer of it seldom satisfied with one view of a subject.—He surveys it in several aspects ;—and is solicitous that different views of it should be adapted to the comprehension of different readers.—He is more anxious that nothing should be forgot, than that those things only should be advanced which make the deepest impression. He is fond of periods flowing, full, and harmonious ;—though authors of this style sometimes compose in short sentences.—Cicero and Addison afford examples.

V.

V.

Plain and simple style

Of extensive use.—May be employed in all addresses to the imagination and the passions, but is chiefly convenient in communicating knowledge.—The order of the words departs little from the order of the ideas.—Seldom admits long sentences.—Allows the use of metaphors and comparisons.—Demands precision in words, and the use of those of most perspicuous signification, and most approved purity.—Homer, Herodotus, Terence, Caesar, Parnel, but particularly Swift, excell in this species of writing.—Degenerates into

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the dry and harsh.—Cudworth, Chillingworth, Barrow.

VI.

Elegant style

Presents a combination of all those qualities which are most approved in writing.—Includes both perspicuity and ornament.—Carefully adapted to the nature of the subject discussed, and the faculties addressed.—Appears with propriety in oratory, history, criticism, essays, poetry, and in every branch of the belles lettres.—Xenophon, Plato, Euripides, Sophocles, Cicero, Livy, Virgil, eminent performers in this style.

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VII.

Elegant writers of modern Italy,—France,—England.—Temple,
—Bolingbroke.—Addison.—Pope.

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—The florid results from excessive use of figures ; the affected from the appearance of too much art in the choice and arrangement of words.—Harvey.—Isocrates.

IX.

Vehement style

Attaches the attention entirely to

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the matter, while the language appears to claim no merit, unless in being a vehicle to the thought.—Consults little the pleasure of the imagination.—Interests the passions, but accomplishes this end chiefly by addressing the understanding.—Employs a train of the most ardent and potent arguments.—Particularly adapted to oratory.—Seldom found in written language.—Demosthenes the greatest master of this species of style.—Cicero not destitute of it.

X.

Degenerates into declamation, which contains little argument or instruction, but a large proportion
of

of inflammatory epithets, founding words, and flowing periods, that fill the ear, but enlighten not the understanding.—All composition declamation in which the author has not some end in view,—to illustrate or confirm some truth,—to delight the imagination by just description,—or to interest the passions with a view to their improvement.

XI.

General rules respecting composition.

1. Acquire a distinct and comprehensive view of the subject to be discussed, and endeavour to discover something new, either in
the

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the matter or manner of treating it.

2. Frequently practise composition.—Writing well depends on habit.—An author may begin with translation ;—but must not long continue this practice.

3. Avoid imitations, and never transcribe from books.

4. Study language grammatically.

5. Never forget the nature of the subject discussed, nor the capacity and spirit of the persons addressed.

PART

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OF ELOQUENCE, or PUBLIC
SPEAKING.

SECTION I.

*Nature of it, and the History of
its Progress.*

I.

“**A**R S bene dicendi,” a preferable definition to the
“ Art of persuasion.”—Objections
against eloquence answered.—Four
things

things necessary to an orator.—
 Solid arguments,—elegant language,—a good character,—and a proper elocution.—Ends of eloquence, and the situations of society in which it commonly makes its appearance.—The early Greeks, and the American tribes, exhibit rude specimens of it.—Every hero among them has an oratorial, as well as a warlike character.

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History of the Roman eloquence.—Causes of its late appearance.—The unpromising state of that republic during the first 500 years of its existence.—Romans chiefly engaged in wars and conquest during the two remaining centuries.—Situation of public affairs at the time of Cicero.—Character of his eloquence.—Reasons of the quick decline of eloquence after the death of that orator.—Apollodorus of Pergamus.

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gamus.—Theodorus of Rhodes.—
Quintilian.

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the Reformation.—Causes of its
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Judicial eloquence of antient
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—Of Scotland.—Criminal courts
of

of the latter more favourable to its exertions than the civil.

VI.

Eloquence of France,—Consists almost entirely of eulogiums and funeral orations.

VII.



Antients divided eloquence into demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial.—Demonstrative consisted of panegyrics delivered at festivals and games.—Deliberative appeared in great assemblies convened for consultation concerning public affairs.—Judicial was found in courts of law.—The last the most eminent
K species.

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Species.—A judicial oration, according to Cicero, contained the following parts:—Introduction,—Narration,—Division,—Proof,—Refutation,—Conclusion or peroration.—Explication of the meaning of each.

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I.

Reason of the division of modern eloquence into that of deliberative assemblies, courts of justice, and the pulpit.

II.

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II.

Deliberative eloquence.

The nature of the business of parliament points out the education necessary to discuss that business, and the character of the eloquence most proper for the discussion.—The business requires a knowledge of the history of government, and the general principles of legislation.—Of the civil and commercial interests of Britain, and of those of its principal neighbours;—of the internal state of the country, and the extent of its resources.

III.

A speaker should be initiated in all the sciences and fine arts.—He should be acquainted with all sorts of elegant composition, history, poetry, criticism, politics,—but particularly the oratory of antiquity.—Limitations with which he should read the last,—and the antient rhetoricians he needs to peruse.—Should study his own language grammatically, and endeavour to acquire the habit of speaking it with correctness and elegance.—Should learn to deliver his sentiments with propriety upon premeditation without writing.—Practice the chief mean of attaining this accomplishment.

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IV.

When conscious of possessing important information, he should not be discouraged by unsuccessful attempts resulting from modesty or fear;—nor have recourse to writing to remedy these defects.—Some discomposure not ungraceful, and extremely promising, in a young speaker.—The study and practice of law a good preparation for the business of parliament.

V.

A young member should attend carefully to the forms of business, and to the style and manner of speaking that high court demands;

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—should,

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The Court of Session judges both of the fact and of the law, and assumes sometimes the prerogative of the Court of Chancery in England, to decide on principles of equity.—The only oratory in the English courts is short addresses from the counsel to the jury ;—or from the judges to the jury on the evidence.

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End of it to instruct men in the means of happiness, and to induce them to pursue it.—View of its topics of discussion.—The advantages of a preacher above other orators;—disadvantages.—Difficulty of finding any thing new, either in the occasion or subject of his oratory.—Little encouragement proposed to industry and eminence.—The subjects of pulpit eloquence should be plain and practical.—Mysteries to be treated as much as possible in the language of revelation.—All refined speculations about moral duties improper.—Best illustrations appeal to characters and cases in real life.—

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All the doctrines of revelation should be held forth as pointing toward practice.

XII.

Style and manner of the pulpit simple, grave, ardent.—All uncouth and learned, all vulgar and slovenly phraseology, censurable.—Divisions should be few, should not interfere with one another, yet should exhaust the subject.—Of little consequence whether they are enumerated in the beginning of a discourse.—Should all bear on one capital point; in illustrating and supporting which consists the unity of a sermon.—No good sermon without unity.—General subjects
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1. Carefully revolve the subject on which it is proposed to write, and form a system of it previous to inquiry for assistance from books.

2. Write slowly, and revise with care.—To procure leisure for prac-

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tifying this rule, a preacher should acquire the habit of speaking from short notes, without writing fully.

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I.

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II.

2. Argumentative part.—Includes all the illustrations and examples, but especially the arguments, by which a speaker establishes the doctrine proposed to be proved.—Solid arguments the nerves of eloquence.—Topica or Loci of the Ancients.—Relate either to persons or actions.—Those relative to persons respect ancestors, country, sex, age, education, character.—Those relative to actions regard motives, place, time,

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Loci argumentorum different from *Loci communes*.

III.

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IV.

IV.

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PART

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OF THE MOST EMINENT KINDS
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AND VERSE.

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XVI.

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sian.

V.

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N

and

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X.

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Its unity and magnitude.——De-
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—First six books abound too much
with episode.——Last six left im-
perfect.——*Æneid* exceedingly de-
fective in respect of characters :—
Those of *Æneas*,—*Dido*,—*Turnus*.
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Diction most musical and dignified.

XVI.

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XXII.

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SYNOPSIS




S Y N O P S I S

OF THE

L E C T U R E S

ON

L O G I C.



SECTION I.

Of Ideas.

I.

OBJECT of education to enlarge knowledge, refine imagination, and improve taste.—The memory chiefly addressed and exercised

exercised in the acquisition of language.—The study of Belles Lettres calculated to cultivate the imagination, in conjunction with the understanding,——to initiate in the principles of taste and philosophy.—Logic an introduction to science, and subservient entirely to the improvement of the understanding, the most eminent of all our faculties.

II.

Logic instructs us how we shall introduce distinctness and order among our ideas; and explains the operations by which we may expect to be most successful in the investigation of truth.—
The first art to which we should
apply

apply attention in our progress toward knowledge ;—because it cultivates that faculty by which we attain all knowledge, and guard ourselves against error.—Every thing in logic that promotes the cultivation of the understanding most deserving attention.—Every thing that promotes not that cultivation unworthy notice.

III.

The abuse of logic no argument against the utility of it.—Neither is the argument valid, that many men reason justly without the study of it.—Practice is the chief mean of obtaining eminence in reasoning as in all other arts ;—but, though prac-

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tice

tice may make a good reasoner, without the knowledge of rules, the latter may yet be of much utility.—The theory of the art of reasoning as serviceable to the practitioner as that of any other art.—The theory of an art is a collection of the best principles and rules of practice ;—Logic, accordingly, is a collection of the best principles and rules of reasoning.

IV.

The theory of logic consists of two parts ;—the contemplation of ideas, which are the materials of all knowledge ;—and the contemplation of the operations of the mind concerned in reasoning.—

The

The best method of treating ideas, and the operations of the mind, is to discuss them conjointly.

V.

The operations of the mind concerned in the search of knowledge are,—Perception,—Judgment,—and Reasoning.

VI.

Perception denotes the operation by which the mind becomes acquainted with all the ideas it possesses.—Judgment signifies the operation which discovers the agreement or disagreement of ideas.—Reasoning is the operation which

O 2 infers

infers the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the help of one or more intermediate ideas.

VII.

All knowledge arising from comparison consists in perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas. —If the agreement is perceived on juxtaposition of the ideas, the knowledge is called Intuitive. —If it is perceived by intermediate ideas, the knowledge is said to be the result of reasoning.

VIII.

In mathematics and arithmetic, agreement means the equality, and dif-

disagreement the inequality, of the quantities compared.—In morals, agreement refers to the order of providence, and the constitution of the human mind; disagreement, to conduct or sentiments inconsistent with, or contrary to, that order and constitution.—In arts and business, agreement and disagreement refer chiefly to experience.—Examples.

IX.

Logic begins with the consideration of ideas as they exist separately in the mind, previous to any operation calculated to discover their agreement or disagreement, or to extract from them any knowledge by means of comparison.

X.

Ideas are the impressions which are made on the mind by external objects; or which are derived from consciousness of its operations.—We receive ideas of the objects in the material world by means of the senses, Sight, Hearing, Taste, Smell, Touch.—Ideas got through these channels are said to be obtained from sensation.—We receive ideas of the operations of our minds, such as, of willing, thinking, reasoning, from our attention to, or consciousness of, these operations.—This class is said to be derived from reflection.—All our ideas proceed from these sources.

XI.

XI.

Ideas are either simple or complex ;—Distinct or confused ;—Adequate or inadequate ;—Particular or abstract.—Simple ideas are perfectly uniform and void of parts.—White, black, hot, cold, and most qualities of bodies, suggest such ideas.—Complex ideas consist of parts, or many simple ideas.—All ideas of bodies, and most of those of science and business, are complex.

XII.

Distinct or clear ideas can readily be separated from all other ideas.—Confused or obscure ideas
cannot

cannot easily be separated from others.—Ideas perfectly distinct scarcely to be had in any branch of knowledge, except mathematics and arithmetic.—Their clearness is the reason these sciences are susceptible of demonstration or certainty.—In all other branches, ideas are more or less obscure ; and, in such cases, knowledge is only less or more probable.—Of the utmost consequence, in these cases, to render ideas as clear as possible, because knowledge will be more satisfactory in proportion.

XIII.

The external object, or the operation of the mind which suggests

gests an idea; is called the Archetype; and the idea is denominated the Picture, or Representative of the archetype.—An adequate idea is a perfect picture of its archetype, or contains a representation of all the parts of which the archetype consists.—An idea may be clear, and not adequate.—An inadequate idea does not completely represent the archetype.—Ideas both clear and adequate, when knowledge is demonstrative, or even highly probable.—When ideas are inadequate, knowledge must be imperfect.—Such are our ideas of substances, and of all the operations in nature by which animals, vegetables, and minerals live, increase, and decay.—Attention and industry might
often

often render ideas more adequate than they are.

XIV.

A particular idea represents one archetype, as Alexander, Bucephalus, St James's.—No particular ideas in the mind except when it is compelled to distinguish individuals.—Tendency of the mind is to survey individuals in classes, and to give general names to them; because it can more expeditiously manage and consider them in that state.—This tendency is called Abstraction, and the ideas formed by it are denominated Abstract.

XV.

XV.

The first stage of abstraction arranges individuals into classes, called Species; such as man, house, horse, hill, rock, river.—Each of these species comprehends many individuals; but the abstract idea of the species includes only the qualities which are common to all the individuals.

XVI.

The next stage of abstraction arranges things into classes still more general, with the same view of conveniency in abridging the number of ideas and words.—It is found, that different species, as
men,

men, horses, sheep, birds, have some common qualities.—Of these are formed genera, such as animal, which denotes the common qualities of all living creatures; vegetable, which denotes the common qualities of all plants; and mineral, which denotes the common qualities of all ores.

XVII.

Abstraction ascends higher still, and forms classes of the qualities which these genera have in common.—Thus, animals and vegetables constitute the class called Animated Nature :—And animals, vegetables, and minerals, may constitute a class, which will scarcely contain

contain any other quality than existence.—The genus next above the species is called the Proximate genus ;—the genus most distant from the species is called the Transcendent one.—Genus and species exist not in nature ; and, therefore, all abstract ideas have, strictly speaking, no archetypes.—The genus contains fewer qualities than the species ; the species fewer than the individual ; and the more abstract and comprehensive any idea is, it contains fewer parts.

XVIII.

Abstraction of use in definitions,
 which are nothing more than ‘ the
 ‘ referring of a species to its genus,
 P ‘ with

‘ with the addition of the quality
‘ which distinguishes that species
‘ from all the other species of the
‘ same genus ;’ or, ‘ the referring of
‘ an individual to its species, with
‘ the addition of the quality which
‘ distinguishes that individual from
‘ all others of the same species.—

A species is sometimes either a genus or a species, as it relates to different individuals or genera. Thus, Tree is a genus, if a particular oak or ash be the individual ; but it is only a species, if Plant be made the genus.

XIX.

All science is conversant about general or abstract ideas.—No property

perty is demonstrated of any figure in mathematics, that is not applicable to all figures of the same species.—The investigations of the theories of politics, morals, arts, and of the rules of prudence, are all general; every individual applies them to his particular case, according to his best judgment.—Were reasoning confined to particulars, researches would be endless, and progress impracticable. We may, however, and often do, reason about particulars; but it is only in cases of necessity similar to those which, in language, oblige us to give names to individuals.—Inferior animals appear incapable of abstraction.

XX.

Rules concerning ideas.

1. Acquire as large a store of them as possible.

Nothing but industry can avail in procuring ideas.—Neither the imagination, nor the understanding, can begin to operate, till ideas, their materials, are accumulated.—We should attain all possible information of science, arts, nature, society, manners, laws, customs.—Should not conclude that we have procured full acquaintance with these topics, after finishing the usual course of education.

XXI.

XXI.

2. Endeavour to attain adequate and distinct ideas of the information received.

Two things are necessary for this purpose ; first, to compare ideas with their archetypes ; second, to compare them with the established meaning of the words by which they are denoted.—In conducting these operations, nothing is required but patience and attention ; and, as they are of the utmost consequence, they should be frequently repeated, particularly in cases of difficulty, and where others have been mistaken.—In morals, politics, metaphysics, criticism, in all the branches of our

knowledge, supported by probable evidence, we have chief cause to attend carefully to these operations.—We are less in hazard of error about ideas of science.

XXII.

Few mistakes are committed about simple ideas.—The far greater part of ideas are complex, and liable to ambiguity.—The least ambiguous class of these is composed of simple ideas of the same kind.—All complex ideas of numbers are repetitions of unity:—All complex ideas of mathematical figures are collections of different ideas of quantity.—In all other sciences, and in arts, complex ideas are composed

posed of ideas of different kinds, and are liable to more ambiguity.— Exemplified in the ideas expressed by the words beauty and taste.— Beauty applied to truth,—animals,—arts.—Taste denotes that sensibility to the perfections of nature, genius, and art, which results from a sound state of the imagination and understanding, and includes a large collection of ideas of different kinds.

All ideas of substances have in them something ambiguous, because what substance is we are utterly ignorant.

XXIII.

Rules concerning complex ideas.

1. En-

1. Endeavour to render the collection of subordinate ideas as complete and accurate as possible ; and in all doubtful cases re-examine with care.

Neglect of this rule a fertile source of controversies.—Exemplified in the dispute about the superior merit of ancient or modern learning.

2. Ascertain the terms which denote complex ideas by enumeration, description, or definition ; and always employ the term defined in the same sense.

XXIV.

Enumeration is a recapitulation of all the subordinate ideas of which

a

a complex idea consists.—Exemplified in the terms Gratitude, Honour.—Description is applied mostly to objects of sense, and contains a collection of all the qualities which distinguish the thing described from all others.—Definition is employed chiefly to ascertain ideas which represent species.—Consists of two parts.—The first part refers the species to its genus, or marks all those things with which it has any thing in common.—The second specifies the quality which distinguishes the species from every other.—Hence the logical rule, That every definition consists of a *genus* and a *differentia specifica*.—Examples.—Definition might also be employed to ascertain individuals,

als, and might supersede enumeration and description.—But little would be gained by this substitution ; because the specific difference would consist of many particulars, and would be, either an enumeration or a description.—In such cases, it is of little consequence to distinguish the genus.

XXV.

We should never attempt to apply definition to simple ideas.—
Examples.—Ideas prompted by objects of sense are sometimes called perceptions.—Ideas which have no archetypes, are called Conceptions.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Of Propositions.

I.

THE comparison of two ideas constitutes the operation of judgment.—The truth and knowledge which result from that comparison are denominated Intuitive. Truth is the agreement of words with ideas ;—Knowledge is the agreement of ideas with one another.—A mistake is the disagreement of words or actions with the nature of things, when they were supposed to agree.—A falsehood is the disagree-

disagreement of words with ideas uttered with an intention to deceive.

II.

Judgment never extends beyond the comparison of two ideas, and the words which denote it are called a Proposition ; affirmative, if they signify the agreement of ideas ; but negative, if they signify their disagreement.—The first idea of a proposition, of which something is affirmed or denied, is called the Subject ; the second idea, containing what is affirmed or denied of the first, is called the Predicate.—If the evidence by which the agreement or disagreement of the ideas
of

of a proposition is supported, is perfectly satisfactory, the proposition is termed Certain; if the evidence is not perfectly satisfactory, the proposition is called Probable.

III.

A proposition is denominated Universal, when the subject of it includes a whole genus or a whole species.—‘All animals are mortal.’ ‘All men are liable to error.’—It is called Particular, when the subject includes only part of a genus, or a part of a species.—‘Some animals are long-lived.’ ‘Some men never offend.’—A singular proposition has an individual for its subject.—‘Alexander conquer-

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‘ed Persia.’—An indefinite proposition may have any individual of a species for its subject.—‘A man may take all pains, but he cannot insure success.’—A conditional proposition is explained by its name, and is commonly introduced by some particle expressive of its nature.—‘If people break the laws, they may expect punishment.’

IV.

Propositions also acquire designations from the different kinds of evidence by which they are supported.—These kinds chiefly five, —Sensation, —Consciousness, —Intuition, —Reasoning, —Testimony.
—The

—The examination of them will lead to the sources of knowledge.

V.

A great part of knowledge is expressed by propositions supported by the evidence of the external senses.

—We have good reason to credit the testimony of these senses ;—never deceive us except in cases where we may expect deception, and are provided with means to detect it.—Foundation of scepticism,—and of the philosophy which denies the existence of the material world ;—namely, that there is no necessary connection between the idea and the existence of its archetype.

VI.

Aristotle explained perception by maintaining that every object had in the mind a representative, called a Phantasm; and that the mind knew nothing of the objects except that they had a power to excite these phantasms.

VII.

Epicurus held perception to be accomplished by means of slender images, *tenuia simulacra*, which bodies continually detached in all directions, and which, entering the mind, generated the conceptions it had of these bodies.

VIII.

VIII.

Lock thought that the colours, tastes, smells, heat, and cold of bodies, which he termed their Secondary Qualities, had no existence in the bodies; and that the bodies possessed a power only to excite the ideas of those qualities in the mind; but he was of opinion, that solidity, extension, figure, which he called the Primary Qualities of Bodies, really existed in them.

IX.

Berckely urged, if secondary qualities were powers only of prompting ideas, that primary qualities might be nothing more; and

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that

that the mind knew no qualities but from its ideas ; the mind, therefore, was not certain that any body existed.

X.

Hume proceeded farther, and maintained, if the mind was not certain of the existence of matter, it was equally uncertain of the existence of spirit ; because it had no knowledge even of spirit, but from its ideas ; in short, that there might be neither matter nor mind in the universe ; that we were sure of the existence of nothing but of ideas.—The whole of this philosophy an attempt to discredit the testimony of the senses.—It is not
true

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true that the mind perceives nothing but its ideas.—It is sure that the archetype is necessary to the existence of the idea, and that no man in his senses can realize such doctrines in business and intercourse.—Such philosophy vain and sophistical.

XI.

Many of the propositions which denote the knowledge of human nature,—morality,—politics,—and arts, are supported by consciousness, or appeals to the constitution of man.—Examples.

XII.

XII.

Intuition a copious source of knowledge, and evinces the truth of all those propositions which are denominated self-evident.—All axioms,—and every step of a demonstration, must be self-evident.

XIII.

Inquiry, whether science is founded on axioms.—Axioms are general propositions declarative of truths that are as obvious in the particular cases from which the axioms are deduced, as they are in the axioms.—The application of an axiom can add no new evidence to the

the particular case.—No useful truth can be deduced from axioms which arises not more naturally from the cases which suggest them.—Axioms help not to discover new cases in reasoning to which they may be applied,—nor to silence sceptics and perverse reasoners.—Never introduced unless in the course of reasoning, when the evidence is as complete without them as with them.—A curious example of the conduct of Euclid in the use of them, taken from the eighth proposition of the second book of the Elements.

XIV.

Reasoning supports a large class
of

of propositions.—This species of evidence will be afterwards more fully explained.

XV.

Much of our knowledge is founded on testimony.—Our information with regard to past events, all things in nature, arts, and business, which are objects of sense, and which we cannot inspect, is derived from testimony.—Affairs make it necessary that we should repose confidence in such evidence.—Most men speak truth, unless they have some temptation to utter falsehood.—It is not easy, in most cases, to tell falsehood, and to preserve consistency, so as to prevent detection.

detection.—Truth congenial to the mind of man.—The evidence of well authenticated facts called Moral certainty.

XVI.

No progress can be made in reasoning without exerting judgment.—It is exerted in all cases of intuitive knowledge ;—it is exerted at the conclusion of every train of reasoning, with respect to the agreement or disagreement of the two principal ideas about which the reasoning is conversant ;—it is exerted in every intermediate step of reasoning between the subject of the proposition to be proved and its predicate.—The essence of sound
logic

logic consists in the proper conduct of this operation.

XVII.

Erroneous judgments called Prejudices.—Reduced by Lord Bacon to four classes, those of the Species, of Language, of the Individual, of Authority.

XVIII.

The prejudices of the species result from the natural imbecillity of the powers of the mind, or from the influence of imagination, passion, and attachment upon the understanding, of which no man, perhaps, can entirely divest himself.

self.—Human vanity has spent much ingenuity in the investigation of subjects beyond the reach of the powers of the mind; or which are at best of little signification.—The knowledge of nature has been obstructed by forming hypotheses, instead of consulting the phenomena, and making experiments.—The progress of truth has been interrupted by the misapplication of the understanding to the cultivation of the logic of the schoolmen.

XIX.

National prejudices mislead the
understandings, and pervert the
judgments of weak minds, and
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of the vulgar in all ages.—The Greeks and Romans.—Passion and attachment in private life seem often to extinguish every spark of candour and reason, and to erect themselves as the standards of truth and merit.—In matters of personal interest, few men can preserve impartiality.—Men of candour, in such cases, generally remit judgment to neutral persons.

XX.

The prejudices of language consist of the erroneous judgments introduced by the imperfection and abuse of words.—The means of preventing these were explained
in

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in treating of Enumeration, Description, and Definition.

XXI.

The prejudices of the individual arise from particular circumstances, such as, constitution of mind or body,—rank in life,—education,—course of study, &c.—The judgments of men not to be expected to agree when founded on doubtful evidence ; and such are those we form of affairs, and of many speculative tenets.—Difference of opinion in these cases attended with no inconveniency, if maintained with patience and temper.—The unanimity of large bodies of men concerning abstract principles, the

effect of authority, rather than of just judgment.—Established systems of opinions apt to lead into error ; but necessary, perhaps, with regard to religious doctrines.—The body of the people incapable of judging for themselves in matters of speculation.

XXII.

Education a fertile source of prejudices.—In all ages, teachers have generally been more disposed to disseminate their own opinions, than the dictates of truth.—Education commonly addressed too much to memory, without sufficiently exercising the understanding.—The accumulation of truth in the memory

mory not more important than the habituating of the understanding to observation and inference.—Unless the mind is accustomed to reason both concerning general truth and the maxims of prudence, in the course of education, the pupil will come into life unprepared for conducting himself with propriety in circumstances in which he must act without a guide, and in which probably he will resign himself to the direction of whim, passion, or vicious example.—The Epicureans, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, more intent to procure proselytes than to inculcate the doctrines of philosophy.—Charles I. and James II. fatal instances of the unfortunate influence of education.

XXIII.

The prejudices of authority derive their origin from the malignant infection of society, and are chiefly those of party spirit, fashion, and speculation.—Party spirit sure to pervert the judgment.—Destroys every principle of decision, but the opinion of the persons to whom we attach ourselves.—Religious party spirit has lost most of its power ; but political party spirit still reigns in full force, and disregards not only the dictates of justice, but even the interest of society.—Prejudices of fashion affect manners, arts, language, dress, amusements, studies, science.—Speculation has infested the investigations

gations of philosophy in all ages.
—Though the hypothetical mode of philosophising is happily exploded, yet inquirers are not, perhaps, sufficiently emancipated from the dominion of system.

XXIV.

Rules to prevent prejudices.

1. Beware of precipitation in judgment, particularly in cases where the pursuit of knowledge leads to new and obscure inquiries; or where our decisions differ from those of men eminent for capacity and discernment, and are likely to involve us in controversy.

The most patient investigators
always the most successful inquirers.

rers.—The most prudent men commonly the most successful.

XXV.

2. Suspend judgment when information is incomplete ; and beware of being misled by authority or example.

Errors of this kind common in politics and in business.—The actions of men the result of attachment, fancy, feeling, whim, caprice, more than of reason.—Modesty and caution peculiarly amiable in young inquirers.

XXVI.

XXVI.

3. Be satisfied with the evidence which the nature of a proposition affords.

This rule applicable to all kinds of evidence, but especially to that of testimony.—Principles which decide its credibility.—First, the nature of the fact related.—If it is impossible, or incredible, no testimony can support it.—Second, whether the testimony is the best the case can supply.—This principle subdivides itself into several inquiries.—Whether the fact was an object of the senses of the relator ; —whether he had leisure to examine it, and made a proper use of that advantage ; —whether he was

a judge of the fact he examined.—
If the relator has not examined
the fact in person, the next object
of inquiry is, whether he has had
recourse to the best information.—
—After ascertaining the capacity
of the relator, and of his inform-
ers, we proceed to examine the
marks of veracity they possess.—
The general presumption holds in
favour of speaking truth, if no
temptation to falsify can be assign-
ed.—A relator adds weight to the
general presumption, if he is at-
tended with other characteristics of
integrity ;—such as telling truth
when it is his interest to conceal
it ;—or having his relation corro-
borated by the authority of cotem-
porary authors of credit. Our in-
ability

ability to explain the causes or the manner of the fact related, no sufficient reason for rejecting the credibility of testimony.—Example from Herodotus.

XXVII.

Should habituate ourselves carefully to patient and candid judgment, if we wish to become expert reasoners.

Practice, as well as rules, necessary to form eminent performers in all the arts.—No rules of logic can make a mechanical reasoner.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Of Reasoning.

I.

ALL knowledge intuitive, demonstrative, or probable.—The first much circumscribed.—Almost all knowledge in science and arts the result of reasoning.—Reasoning begins where intuition ends; and demonstrative reasoning ends where probable reasoning begins.—Demonstration requires that the perception of the agreement of every pair of ideas should be clear and distinct,—Probability that the perception

perception of the agreement of every pair of ideas should be more clear and distinct than that of their disagreement.—If probable reasoning relate to speculation, the judgment founded on it is denominated Opinion.—If it relate to facts, the judgment is called Belief.

II.



The sciences of quantity afford illustrious specimens of demonstrative reasoning, and a noble exemplification of the rules of logic.—An analysis of the reasoning in the first proposition of the first book of Euclid; and of that in the 47th proposition of the same book.—

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No

No fewer than eighteen intermediate ideas requisite to show the agreement between the square of the side opposite to the right angle, and the squares of the sides containing the right angle.

III.

Morality, politics, arts, and business, supported by probable reasoning.—Morality erroneously supposed susceptible of demonstration.—The line which discriminates virtues from vices not so distinctly drawn as to afford this high kind of evidence.

IV.

IV.

Specimens of probable reasoning in support of the proposition which asserts, 'that man should love his 'Creator ;'—and of that which asserts 'the agreement between the 'freedom of human actions, and 'the infliction of future punishment.'—A specimen of political reasoning adduced to prove that 'industry is the capital source of 'national wealth.'—Objections to which this reasoning is exposed, and which render imperfect the conviction it affords.—Probability sufficient to guide us in that course of conduct which may secure our happiness.——Analogical reasoning

often the best we have to employ in business.

V.

Reasoning is either direct or indirect.—In direct reasoning, we begin with the subject of a proposition, and proceed through a train of intermediate ideas, to shew its agreement with the predicate.—Indirect reasoning is employed only when the predicate of a proposition admits an alternative, and when either the predicate or the alternative must agree with the subject.—The following are such propositions. ‘The sun is either above the horizon or below it.’—‘A straight line drawn at right angles
‘ to

‘to the extremity of the diameter
 ‘of a circle, must fall either with-
 ‘out or within the circle.’—In in-
 direct reasoning, it is proved that
 the alternative cannot agree with
 the subject of the proposition,
 whence it is inferred that the pre-
 dicate must agree with it.—This
 mode of reasoning perfectly satisfac-
 tory, and frequently employed by
 mathematicians.—Examples.

VI.

Reasoning proceeds either *a pri-
 ori* or *a posteriori*.—In the former,
 we reason from cause to effect; in
 the latter, from effect to cause.—
 If, from the nature of the soul,
 particularly its capacity of think-

ing, I infer its immateriality and immortality, I reason *a priori*; but if, from the beauty, order, and wisdom displayed in the works of nature, I infer the existence of their Author, I reason *a posteriori*.—Reasoning *a priori* much circumscribed, because we know little of causes but from their effects.—Reasoning *a posteriori* much more frequent both in philosophy and affairs.

VII.

Reasoning, again, is divided into Analytic and Synthetic.—This distinction refers chiefly to mathematical investigation.—In the analytic method, we begin with the predicate of a theorem or problem,
and

and trace backward all the intermediate steps, till we observe whether it agrees or disagrees with the subject.—In the former case, we discover that the reasoning we supposed legitimate, is really so; in the latter, that the proposition is false, or that some other proof must be sought.—After ascertaining the legitimacy of a piece of reasoning by analysis, we proceed to propose it by way of synthesis; which is nothing more than a process the reverse of the former.—We begin with the subject of the proposition, and descend, by intermediate steps, till we show its agreement with the predicate.—Examples of both kinds of reasoning.—Algebra the chief method of analysis in modern times.

VIII.

Logicians mention the following distinctions of arguments.—When we argue from principles admitted by an adversary, we are said to employ an *argumentum ad hominem*.—When we urge in our defence some eminent authority, which our adversary is supposed to be ashamed to oppose, we are said to adduce an *argumentum ad verecundiam*.—When we puzzle an adversary by reasoning which he does not understand, we make use of what is called *argumentum ad ignorantiam*.

IX.

IX.

Logicians divide sophistical reasoning also into different kinds, of which the following are the capital.

X.

1. *Ignoratio Elenchi* takes place when an adversary or an inquirer either wilfully or inadvertently mistakes the nature of the subject under discussion.—This error very common, particularly in political controversy.—Examples.

XI.

2. *Petitio Principii* appears when a reasoner assumes, as certain, the proposition

proposition or question required to be proved.—An egregious solecism.—Examples.

XII.

3. *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*, is a sort of reasoning in which one particular is inferred from another, or a general conclusion from a particular case.—A frequent and most erroneous mode of argumentation.—Examples.

XIII.

4. *Causam assignare quae causa non est*, refers chiefly to natural knowledge, and consists in forming
ing

ing hypotheses to account for the operations of nature, without consulting the phaenomena.—This method of philosophising has been very prevalent both in antient and modern times.—Examples from Aristotle and Des Cartes.

XIV.

5. Reasoning in a circle assumes one proposition to prove another, and then employs the second to establish the first.—Examples.

S E C T.

S E C T. IV.

Of Syllogism.

I.

VIEW of the progress of the logic of Aristotle.—The most obscure of all the treatises of that voluminous author.—As fully delineated in his writings as in the numerous and bulky productions of his commentators.—Works of Aristotle remained unknown near 160 years after his death.—Early read and translated by the Arabians.—Little known in Europe till the middle of the eleventh century.

ry.—The order of schoolmen, and the origin of colleges.—Schools were erected in every cathedral, and in most monasteries.

II.

Disputation by syllogism the chief study and employment of teachers and scholars.—The opinions of Aristotle were indisputable, and the veneration he acquired approached idolatry.—Remarkable case of Peter Ramus.

III.

A syllogism consists of three propositions.—The first is called the Major ; the second the Minor ;
T and

and the third the conclusion.—

Example,

All animals are mortal ;
Man is an animal ;
Therefore, man is mortal.

IV.

Each proposition possesses quantity and quality.—As to quantity, it is universal or particular ; as to quality, it is affirmative or negative.—Hence four sorts of propositions only can enter syllogisms, namely, universal affirmatives, or universal negatives, particular affirmatives, or particular negatives. To help the memory, the first sort are marked by the vowel *a*, the
second

second by the vowel *e*, the third by the vowel *i*, and the fourth by the vowel *o*.

V.

Though a syllogism contain three propositions, it includes only three ideas, which are called Terms, and each of them is twice repeated, to complete the three propositions.—The predicate of the conclusion is called the Major Term; the subject of it, the Minor Term; and the term with which each of these is compared in the premises, or major and minor propositions, is called the Middle Term.—In the example adduced, Mortal is the major term; Man is the minor
T 2 term,

term, and animal is the middle term.

VI.

The figure of a fyllogism is determined by the position of the middle term.—The mode of a fyllogism relates to the quantity and quality of the propositions of which it consists.

VI.

The middle term never enters the conclusion, and therefore can admit only four positions.—As it must be twice mentioned in the premises, it may be the subject of the major premise, and the predicate
of

of the minor, when the syllogism will belong to what is called the First Figure ;—or it may be the predicate of both premises, when the syllogism will belong to the Second Figure ;—or it may be the subject of both premises, when the syllogism will belong to the Third Figure ;—or it may be the predicate of the major premise, and the subject of the minor premise, when the syllogism will belong to the Fourth Figure.

VIII.

If the three propositions are universal affirmatives, the syllogism is said to be of the mode *Barbara*, a scholastic word, significant only

T 3

by

by containing the vowel *a* three times, which denotes that the propositions are all universal affirmatives.—If a syllogism consist of an universal negative major proposition, an universal affirmative minor proposition, and an universal negative conclusion, which propositions are denoted respectively by the vowels *e*, *a*, *e*, it is said to belong to the mode *Celarent*, a word which contains these vowels.—If a syllogism consist of an universal affirmative major proposition, a particular affirmative minor proposition, and a particular affirmative conclusion, it belongs to the mode *Darii*, a word formed of the vowels *a*, *i*, *i*.—If a syllogism contain an universal negative major premise,

premise, a particular affirmative minor premise, and a particular negative conclusion, it belongs to the mode *Ferio*, containing the vowels *e*, *i*, *o*.—These are all the conclusive modes of the first figure.

IX.

In the second figure are found also four conclusive modes, denominated by the words *Cesare*, *Camestres*, *Festino*, *Baroco*, in which the vowels only are significant, and are to be explained in the same manner as those of the former figure.

X.

X.

The third figure contains six legitimate modes, distinguished by the hard names *Darapti*, *Felapton*, *Dissamis*, *Datifi*, *Bocardo*, *Ferison*.—

The modes of the fourth figure are held to be either insignificant, or easily reduceable to those of the first.—Examples of syllogisms of the different figures and modes.

XI.

In each of the figures there are singular syllogisms not reduceable to the modes of these figures, but allowed to be legitimate.—In these syllogisms one of the terms denotes an individual.—Examples.

XII.

XII.

Irregular syllogisms.

Enthemem is a syllogism in which one of the premises is omitted, and the conclusion is drawn from the other premise.—Example.

Whatever thinks is a spiritual substance :

Therefore, the mind of man is a spiritual substance.

XIII.

A Sorites consists in connecting a series of propositions in such a manner, that the predicate of the preceding proposition forms the subject of the succeeding.—Example.

‘ The

‘ The mind is a thinking substance ; a thinking substance is a spirit ; a spirit has no parts ; what has no parts is indissoluble ; what is indissoluble is immortal ; therefore the mind is immortal.’——

A sorites is a train of syllogisms abridged.

XIV.

A conditional syllogism is a conclusion deduced from a conditional proposition.—Example.

XV.

A disjunctive syllogism is a conclusion drawn from a premise which

which admits an alternative.—Example.

XVI.

Rules to try the legitimacy of syllogisms.

1. Must contain three terms only.
2. Must not consist of negative propositions.
3. The conclusion must be particular, if either of the premises be particular.
4. The middle term must be taken universally in one of the premises.

When the middle term is taken universally, it relates to a genus ;
when

when it is taken particularly, it has reference to a species.

XVII.

Merit of fyllogism as a mode of reasoning.—A fyllogism is the comparison of two ideas by means of a third; a demonstration, therefore, or a train of ideas which forms an argument, must consist of as many fyllogisms as there are steps in the train.—The demonstration of the first proposition of the first book of Euclid expressed in fyllogisms.

XVIII.

The fyllogistic form adds no light to the perception of the agreement

greement of ideas which the mind possessed not in their natural state of juxta-position.—Neither does it help in the discovery of middle terms.—These must be had before the syllogism can be formed.

XIX.

Inquiry why the conclusion of every syllogism is always a self-evident, and generally either a trifling or an insignificant proposition.

XX.

One term of every regular syllogism denotes a species; another the genus of that species; and the third is compared, and found either

U

to

to agree or disagree with both.—
Examples.

XXI.

In reducing a train of ideas into the syllogistic form, the major term of every syllogism is one of the steps in the natural train, the minor term is the first idea of the train, and the middle term is the genus of the minor.—The whole mystery of syllogism resolves itself into this principle, that, whatever agrees with a genus, must agree with every species of that genus, and whatever differs from the former, must differ also from the latter.

VIEW

V I E W
O F
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

THE chief faculties of the mind
are,

Memory,
Reason, and
Imagination.

To them all knowledge may be
supposed to be addressed.

To memory, history, or the know-
ledge of facts.

To reason, philosophy, or the know-
ledge of judgment and inference.

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To imagination, poetry, or the
knowledge of ornament.

P A R T I.

I.

History is either
Sacred,
Civil, or
Natural.

Sacred comprehends the revealed
facts relative to Deity and Provi-
dence.

Civil, the facts relative to society.

Natural, the facts relative to ani-
mals, vegetables, and minerals.

II.

II.

Civil history subdivides itself into

Political, and
Literary.

Political exhibits the legislative, executive, and military transactions of communities, which are related in

Memoirs,
Annals,
Biography, or
History, strictly so called.

It pre-supposes an acquaintance with

Antiquities, or the knowledge of antient monuments.

Chronology, or the computation of time.

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Geography,

Geography, or the knowledge of the surface of the earth.

III.

Literary displays the progress of genius, or the efforts of the mind for the improvement of science and art.

IV.

Natural history presents an account of

The productions of nature, and
The changes made in these productions by the exertions of art.

The productions are found either

Above

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Above the surface of the earth,
Upon it, or
Below it.

V.

The productions above the earth
are discovered in the

Fixed stars,
The planets, and
The atmosphere.

The fixed stars and planets furnish the phaenomena recounted and explained by the astronomer.

The atmosphere, the phaenomena of winds, vapours, meteors, &c.

VI.

VI.

The productions on the surface of the earth exhibit materials for the history of animals and vegetables, which contains an account of the generation, situation, temper, manner of life, attachments, and hostilities, &c. of the former, and of the figure, growth, use, and duration, &c. of the latter.

VII.

The productions below the surface of the earth present the phenomena of springs, precious stones, and ores, from which last are extracted most of the metals that furnish employment for art.

VIII.

VIII.

The useful arts are very numerous. The following are the materials about which the chief of them are employed :

Gold,
Silver,
Stone,
Glas,.
Copper,
Tin,
Lead,
Silk,
Wool,
Cotton,
Flax.

The fine arts will appear under the knowledge of ornament.

PART

P A R T II.

I.

PHILOSOPHY, or the knowledge
of reasoning, refers either to
Spirit,
Man, or
Matter.

II.

The chief branch of the science
of Spirit relates to Deity, and con-
stitutes Theology,
Natural, and
Revealed.

Natural contemplates Deity as
the moral governour of the uni-
verse,

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 239

verse, and delineates the conduct of rational creatures which results from that authority.

Revealed communicates the knowledge of virtue and happiness which Deity hath been pleased to transmit directly from himself.

III.

Any other acquaintance we have with spirit is derived from experience, and constitutes the science of Pneumatology, which exhibits an account of the properties of mind, and is the first branch of knowledge relative to man.

IV.

IV.

The other parts of knowledge
relative to man contemplate him
as

Rational,
Social, and
Accountable.

They form the sciences of
Logic,
Rhetoric, and
Morality.

V.

Logic treats of
Ideas,
Propositions, and
Reasoning.

It

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 241

It discusses also the nature of
Evidence,
Prejudices, and
Sophistry.

The method of induction of
Lord Bacon is calculated entirely
for the advancement of natural
knowledge.

VI.

Rhetoric, in an extended sense,
may include the arts of
Retention, and
Communication.

Retention depends upon the arts
subserving to recollection, particu-
larly writing and printing.

Communication presupposes the
possession of taste, extensive in-
X for-

formation, and the habit of elocution.

It requires, beside, acquaintance with the arts of grammar and criticism.

VII.

Morality includes
Jurisprudence, and
Ethics.

The former has for its object the happiness of communities ; the latter that of individuals,

Jurisprudence explains the arrangement of civil constitutions with the legislative and executive departments of government.

Ethics delineate the sentiments and principles individuals must cultivate,

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tivate, and the duties they must perform in order to be happy.

VIII.

The science of matter regards
The general properties of body,
The quantity of its surface or
parts, or
Its figure and constitution.

IX.

Extension, figure, solidity, motion, &c. are commonly reckoned general properties of body. The science, which discusses them is called Metaphysics.

X 2

X.

X.

Quantity is considered as cohering or continuous ; in which view it is the object of pure mathematics or geometry ; or it is contemplated as discrete or separated into parts, when it becomes the object of arithmetic.

XI.

Geometry investigates the properties of regular figures, circles, squares, triangles, &c. in order to ascertain their measure or extent ; and in performing this task, exhibits most beautiful specimens of logic, attended with evidence perfectly satisfactory.

XII.

XII.

Arithmetic computes the amount of classes of individuals, by addition and subtraction, into which all the operations of this science are resolvable. Many of the operations are mechanical, but their principles are certain, and their evidence is demonstrative.

XIII.

The application of geometry to the investigation of the laws of nature, has produced many sciences not less illustrious for high evidence than splendid truth.

Mechanics, which explain the general principles of machinery.

X 3

Hydro-

Hydrostatics, which unfold the properties of fluids.

Physical astronomy, which investigates the laws that regulate the motions of the heavenly bodies.

Optics, which exhibit the curious phenomena of light and colours, and demonstrate the powers of glasses.

XIV.

The chief sciences relative to the figure and constitution of matter are,

Chemistry, which investigates the general qualities of body, and demonstrates, by analysis and composition, how different bodies

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 247

bodies are formed from the mixture of different quantities of these qualities.

Botany, which describes the appearance, enumerates the properties and culture of plants, and includes gardening and agriculture.

Mineralogy, which explains the arrangement of the various strata that appear near the surface of the earth, with the theory of searching for, and extracting metals from ores.

Zoology, which unfolds the structure, functions, and characters of animals.

XV.

Zoology comprehends
Anatomy, which teaches the situation and uses of the bones, blood-vessels, nerves, and muscles of animals, particularly of man.

Medicine, which enumerates the diseases incident to man, with their cures.

Ferriery, falconry, &c. which delineate the management and functions of other animals than man.

P A R T

P A R T III.

I.

THE knowledge addressed to the imagination includes all elegant productions of genius, whether communicated by

Words,

Figures, or

Sounds.

II.

The productions communicated by words, appear either in

Prose, or

Poetry.

Elegant prose is susceptible of every embellishment which may solicit or prompt the attention
of

of the reader, and is not incompatible with the instruction of his understanding.

III.

Poetry is either

Epic, which proposes to excite admiration ;

Dramatic, which attacks the passions of terror and pity, or ridicules vices and follies ;

Descriptive, which pleases the imagination by beautiful pictures of Nature and art ; or

Didactic, which combines instruction with ornament.

Other inferior species are known by the names of Odes, Songs, Epigrams, &c.

Verifica-

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 251

Verification is common to all kinds of poetry ; and the art which teaches the metrical laws of the different kinds is called Prosody.

IV.

The capital productions of figures are those of the Painter and Engraver. They are either

History pieces, in which some point of an important action is represented, and all the persons concerned are exhibited in their proper attitudes and exertions, or

Portraits, which present an imitation of some human form, or

Pictures, which delineate views of Nature, of particular animals, or of plants.

Many

252 V I E W O F, &c.

Many other figures are, the
workmanship of the
Statuary, and
Architect.



V.

The productions communicated
by sound are those of music, which
appear in the form of

Melody, or

Harmony ;

And obtain the characters of

National,

Solemn,

Slow,

Quick,

Lively, &c.

F I N I S.

